ASSESSMENT AND CRITIC THE ARGUMENT OF POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY

Abdoallah Niksirat,
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Iran
(a.niksirat@scu.ac.ir)

Abstract. In this thesis, we tried to present a brief discussion about possibility and incumbency theorem, since Ebne Sina [Known as Avicenna in western culture] has priority in this topic; his opinion is main center of our discussion. Pivotal item in Ebne sina’s theorem is existence of an external fact independent of human, which is the boundary between philosophy and sophistry. One of Ebne sina preliminary items in Ebne Sina’s proof is nullity of progression and circuit, although some believe Ebne Sina has not specified this as a preliminary for theorem clearly, but later his interpreters, such as Fakhr-E-Razi or Khaje Nasir Tusi, consider this item as a preliminary for theorem of possibility and incumbency. In Islamic world, this theorem attracted attention by later theosophists, the most famous one by Mulla-Sadra. Sadra’s statement for this theorem is according to some of his special basic such as graded and existence-oriented (different from western existentialism). Meanwhile, this theorem found its way through western philosophy by translation, especially in Thomas –school and he is affected by this theorem.

Keywords: Possibility, Necessity, and God proof.
**Introduction.** There is no doubt topic of (existence of God) is one of oldest and basic and most critical question for human times. This question was and always is by human and everybody; either illiterate or theosophist has asked this question. In this thesis, it is tried to study and explain one of statements one of eldest philosophers, Avicenna among all isms and religions, since author believes that contribution of philosophers and theosophists to prove God existence was higher than other. Why Ebn-e-Sina? Because he is one of first Muslim philosophers, who tried to present more rational proof of God existence and theorem of possibility and incumbency, which is his masterpiece about God.

Now, we explain history of this theorem briefly. History of theorem of possibility and incumbency (Sinavi [Sinavi means Belongs to Ebne Sina] theorem).

Theorem of possibility and incumbency has been prevalent among eastern and western thinkers and had some similarity by cosmological argument especially among Christian petitioners. Foundation and basic of different rations known as theorem of possibility and incumbency by Ebne Sina, is proof according to acceptance of external fact which is the boundary between philosophy and sophistry. One of most important question is that who first time presented it. It seems that although there are some hints in Farabi’s thoughts such as his explanation:

If it was possible for existence set to be existing without a final incumbency and if it was possible for the origin of existence to be possible per se, then:

There is self-creation of a being and clearly, it is impossible (Alemi, 42, narrated by Badvi, 102/3). This proof was first time explained and present in current explanation by Ebne Sina.

Therefore, Ebne Sina is prior respect to other for explanation and presenting this theorem and even later by translation of Ebne Sina (or Aveicina) thoughts to Christian petitioners, this theorem has found its way in western philosophy and most famous one is Thomas Aquinas (Ilkhan, 2003, p320-329 and Copleston, 2007). However Thomas proof is known as cosmological argument and briefly is:

All things around us in the world are possible existence. In other word, it was possible they could be nullity. So there should be a time when there was nothing and could not be created. Now we find some beings in the world so we can conclude that there should an existence who is not possible to exist (incumbency or has to be exist) we call him as God (John Hake, 1993, 57-56).

It is worthy to mention that although Thomas owe to Ebne SIna for his ration, he explained it in similar way to Ebne-Roshd who thought possible existence mean some timely occurrence and considered possibility as time possible existence. Whereas Ebne Sina considered essence possibility and he means essential occurrence as occurrence.

It should be noted that Ebne Sina presented this theorem in his books (Nejat) and (Shafa) before writing his book (Esharat). He explained this theorem with more detail in his book (Esharat va Tanbihat) which is one of his most important philosophical books in final period of his life and called it as (Borhan-E-Sediqin or Right proof). However, we can mention about this theorem in book (Esharat), Ebne-Sina has said:

There is no doubt we believe there is a fact, either possible or incumbency. If we accept being as incumbency then we accepted incumbency existence so our aim has been satisfied which is proof of incumbency existence, but if we consider being as possible, then this possible being should rely on an incumbency being. ( Ebne Sina123,1991).

However, Mulla sadra considered right as an effect-oriented proof so he believes it is insufficient, therefore he presented a new statement for this proof (Mulla Sadra, 1990, 26-76).

Theorem of possibility and incumbency (Sinavi theorem). As we mentioned, since the best narration for Ebne-Sina theorem of possibility and incumbency is presented in Esharat va Tanbihat, there we used this narration. This is exactly what Ebne Sina said:

If you consider any being per se without considering any other thing, then either being is incumbency per se or no. If it has incumbency per se, so the being is right per se which has incumbency per se, other things rely on it. And if it has no incumbency per se, therefore it would not be right to say it is recusant, and existence has been purposed after it , and if no condition exists, then there is a third attribute remained which is ((possibility))) and it means neither incumbency nor recusant (Ebne Sina, 1989, 1, 259).

Mentioned proof has been presented by Ebne Sina in fourth section of the Book ((Esharat va-Tanbihat)) according to Holy Quran.

He claims since in this proof, existence is considered by existence and other beings are proved by ((Holy Right-Self existence per se)) respect to other beings and possibilities and unity of Self existences has been shown, then this proof is Right proof.

Since theosophist man, believes God per se not according to other beings. In other word, according to holy Quran:

We will show them our omens in Horizons (outside world of human) and inside them to prove them, he is right. Ordinary people prove and believe God by omens in horizons and themselves, although it is good but theosophist man believes God according to this Ayeh in Quran:

Isn’t it enough for your God to be witness for all?
Theosophist man’s belief about

God is witness and proof for all things, in other word Ebne Sina believes that this Ayeh says that God is above any clear and seen thing; it means even if you want to know yourself, God is Prima Facie at first then you!

As Imam Sadeq says: no creature can be known except God helps to be known, and nothing is known except by God. It means nobody can know anything except God help, even God is known by God (Javadi Amoli, 1999, 112-2).

This is the same word by Ebne Sina about Right proof:
Know how there is no need for other thing to prove holiness for God except himself. Moreover, know how our explanation did not need to consider creature and his action, although creature is also a proof for God’s existence. But this way is more strong and stiff, i.e. Considering existence as existence and prove self existence by himself, as to prove other beings by self-existence (Ebne Sina, 1989, 397/1). It is likely according to Ebne Sina, Right proof is intuition knowledge and the word ((Shahid- witness)) is used because of this concept (Mesbah Yazdi, 1984, 410-411).

It is worthy to say that Islamic petitioners prove a non-moving mover through proof of occurrence of body and effects and natural rules for motion. However, both of these reasons are from effect to cause and this induction is known as effect-oriented proof. However, Ebne Sina claims that his proof is higher and better than all other proofs since he uses self-existence to prove self-existence. Therefore, he says that this way is cause-oriented and believes that in this theorem, incumbency of existence proves existence of other possible beings or As Rumi says:

The Sun is the reason of the sun. (We already know the reason)

Presuppose and preliminary for proof of possible and incumbency of existence by Ebne Sina:

There are different views about preliminary and presuppose of theorem of (possible and incumbency) and some important views and differences are presented here. Whereas some believe there should be 12 preliminaries for this theorem, but we mentioned few ones according to significant book of (Esharat va- Tanbihat) written by Ebne Sina:

1. Suppose of non-sensible beings
2. Acceptance for four type of cause among all material world and acceptance for existence of active cause for all of these causes, who is active cause of causes, different type of other cause which are ultimate, form, or material cause.
3. Division of being into self-existence, possible existence and accepting possible existence will lead into an ultimate cause of cause.

Therefore, thinkers after Ebne Sina, such as Fakhr-e-Razi, or Khaja-Nasir-edin –Tusi, mentions the rejection of circuit and progression of existence as some preliminaries, since Ebne Sina had not mentioned these preliminaries.

It is worthy to say that except Sheikh-Eshraq who mentioned rejection of circuit and progression of existence as preliminaries in his book: Al-moshare va- almatarehat (not Hekmat-Eshraq), other thinkers after Ebne Sina, such as Fakhr-e-Razi and Khaje-Nasir-Tusi made mistake about Ebne-Sina’s viewpoint in two items:

1. They did not use two first preliminaries (1,2) for proof of God, whereas without acceptance of these two preliminaries it is not possible to reach to the third preliminary:

Because just non-sensible beings can be, active cause and sensible being or even human cannot be an active cause for natural occurrence.

2. They mentioned rejection of circuit and progression of existence as preliminaries for Ebne Sina’s theorem, whereas Ebne Sina emphasizes that limit or unlimited of progression and as result rejection of progression has no effect on his proof (Yasrebi, 2004, 4-83)

Here, we present a brief reference without judgment.

At first when it is said in preliminary 3- (if possible thing want to be created, it requires a cause, and if the cause be possible then it would require another cause and at last there should be cause of causes who needs no cause))

This statement does not imply to rely on rejection of circuit or progression of existence. However, Ebne Sina clearly announces that, this theorem doesn’t depend on rejection of circuit or progression. Since the concept of rejection of progression and circuit of existence says that progression of cause and effect ultimately lead into cause of causes.

Secondly, although creator is considered as active cause, but without supposing of other causes (material, form and ultimate type) it is not possible something be found or created outside of region of active cause. As Alameh Mozafar says in the book (Logic):

Whenever an alone cause from of four type of cause be considered for creation, then other cause are considered without mention. Since cause means a complete cause not an incomplete one and active cause is just an incomplete cause. However, in spite of Aristotle who believes first mover is the ultimate cause of the globe, Ebne Sina considered creator of the world as an active cause. There is no doubt that we should think whether Ebne Sina means active cause as alone cause from four type of causes or not?

Thirdly: as it was mentioned set of effects and possible are considered as unit effect and as all effect need a cause, then the whole of effects requires a cause and the cause of the whole of effects and possible cannot be inside of then but there should be an outside cause to create them. But does this ration depends on rejection of progression and circuit inside it or not? Since when we say there is no priority between then constituents of the set it means we accept the principle of preference and rejection of choice without preference and this is the same as rejection of progression and circuit of existence and priority of thing respect to being.

Therefore isn’t it right to say, since Ebne Sina thought principles and rules such as rejection of circuit and progression, and the principle of external fact and cause-effect are prima facie, then without mentioning their name and other introductions such as rejection of contradictory-union, he presented his proof. Particularly Ebne Sina believes that pure sophists and deniers of external fact should be physically punished so long as they confess external fact by sensing the pain!

However, there is a question remained even for Ebne Sina: Why this cause of causes or holy self existence should be Abraham’s religions God? Since, inspite of Mola Sadra’s right proof, Ebne Sina’s proof cannot prove God’s theism (Javadi Amoli, 1989, 135).
But it seems that this bug also exists in other proofs such as (non moving mover) or natural motion proof or (wisdom organizer) or (order proof). Since it is possible to ask in those proofs is wisdom organizer, or non moving mover is the same as Abraham’s God?

Answering this question needs other ration and reasons. For example if it is said for (incumbency and possible being) it is shown that possible being need a self existence creator, or if it is said for (order-proof) the ordered world has an organizer. In other word, what is directly shown by the results of mentioned theorems is to prove some conceptual thesis in which their subject is possible and affect beings. In other word, some concepts have been shown for creature and self existence has not been proved and therefore Hume, or Immanuel Kant consider all rations and proofs for them to be defective and unreliable.

Briefly it is possible to say that the theorem of (incumbency and possible beings) is based on three preliminaries: 1. we understand personal-ly or Adventitious-ly that there is a possible being or occurrence 2. Any possible existence need a cause 3. Sequence of these possible beings or causes ultimately lead to cause of causes or self-existence.

However, some interpreters and critics such as Fakhr-e-Razi and Khaje-Nasir-Tusi believe rejection of progression or circuit as the preliminaries for this proof. For example, Khaje-Nasir Tusi clearly says or right proof based on rejection of progression or circuit of existence and he says:

Existence as self-existence and it is desirable, otherwise it requires with the impossible circuit and progression (Alame Heli, 1996: 392).

However it is possible to say about Ebne Sina’s viewpoint, according to some narration there is no need for rejection of progression or circuit for this theorem. Since Ebne Sina clearly explains in his book (Esharat va-Tanbihat) limit or unlimited sequence of possible beings has no effect on this proof. As Ebne Sina said:

For any sequence of causes and effects, limited or unlimited, if there is nothing except the sequence of effects then the sequence needs an outside cause and this sequence is attached to the outside cause (Ebne Sina 1989, 364/1).

In the other hand, according to some of his explanation in the book of (Elahiat-e Nejat) it has been shown he supposed rejection of progression and circuit as some preliminaries for his proof. For example, in the same book after division of facts into possible and incumbent he announced if we accept incumbent existence then we reach into proof for self-existence, but if we consider the fact of beings be all possible then this world should be related to a self existence because:

Possible cannot be created by circuit even if their number is limited (Ebne Sina, 1991, 123-5). Shahid-Motahari considered rejection of progression as a requirement for Ebne Sina’s proof, but he says the difference between Ebne Sina’s proof and Mulla Sadra is:

Ebne Sina thought possibility for beings means their requirement to a cause. However Mulla Sadra considered existence itself as criteria for need to cause and he believes that there is two type of existence type, rich type and poor type or high and low ones, the high or rich type of existence is the same as self-existence and poor or low type is for the ranking of other beings who are possible beings. In other word, Mulla Sadra considered existence itself as criteria for need to cause, in spite of Ebne Sina who thought possibility as criteria for need and incumbency as criteria for being rich. In other word, Ebne Sina considered criteria of need as a nature-oriented possibility, whereas Mulla Sadra considered existence-need or lighting-addition for creature to self-existence as criteria for need to cause (Motahari 1986, 131-129/2), (Javadi Amoli, 1999, 211-15 and the same 1989, 133-35).

Also Alame Tabatabie considered rejection of progression and circuit as preliminaries for Ebne Sina’s proof and know his ration as a cause-oriented proof in which we reach from one being’s requirement in other beings, but at the same time he believes it helps for certainty (Tabatabaei, 1983, 270-1). Because cause-oriented proof has, two type:

First type or reason in which we argue from effect into cause and it cannot help for certainty. Second type in which: a required existence leads to another required existence or from one effect to another effect, which helps certainty. Assessment and critic of theorem of “possibility and incumbency” in Western philosophers’ viewpoint:

It is said that nature- possibility which is the middle for (incumbency and possibility proof) is an attribution of nature-essence and is impartible of it since the adjective of (possible) never leaves nature and need or requirement for a possible to a existence- cause always be remained as long as it exist. However, Khaje Nasir criticizes on this statement, i.e. rejection of circuit and progression in this proof, and he said:

Set of possible beings is a subjective concept and there is no additional fact on sequence of individuals and there is not external fact by the name of set, so it is not possible to attribute possibility or cause and affect concept (Javadi Amoli, 1999, 150-4)

Hume who says presents another critic:

If the ratio of world constituent be the same respect to existence and nullity, and if all external beings can be attributed to possibility and need cause, anyway it is not possible to use this rule for whole, because we never tested the whole of world to be sure their need for cause.

But it is possible to answer in this way:

Asker i.e. Hume thought there is a real set in mentioned theorem. Whereas the mentioned theorem says it is not possible for possible being been created independently and this is true for all of possible beings not the set of possible, because there is no real set as logic says it is not the case for not including in the subject.

There is another critic by Hume and Immanuel Kant: incumbency, essentiality is a logic subject, and it is not possible to announce about existence. In other word, incumbency and essentiality is not a distinctive adjective of beings but just for statement and the statement of “God exist” is an existence statement not a statement which emphasizes on
relation between concepts and being sure about incumbency and essentiality of such statement is so problematic (Paul Edwards, 1991, 65).

To answer to this question it is said: Essentiality and incumbency in logic and philosophy have the same meaning but these two are clear concepts, philosophy at first proved their realization and fact and logic used philosophy as subjective principle. In addition, not only philosophy essentiality means external facts and things but also logic essentiality not limited to analytical subjects but it includes essences of theorem too. Since essences of theorem include concepts outside of thing definition including “possibility concept” which is mentioned in incumbency and possibility. In other word, incumbency and possibility theorem does not depend on subjective nature and concepts, but there is also wisdom external facts and the concept of “being” is not considered as a subjective concept, but the concept of being as antitype. It means the same as verification prime facie and this is the boundary between sophistry and philosophy. Therefore, essentiality and incumbency related to God is not similar to essentiality of being in analytical problem or logical needs, such as essence, adjective or conditional need which are about way and quality of relation between a concept and subjective, but it is about severity and degree which has no fact except identity and objectivity (Javadi Amoli, 1999, 158-163).

In other word:

Askor thought since essentiality and incumbency is a pure logical concept limited to the same way theorems, then if God as self-existence has objective essentiality, then the objective existence gets conceptual in which existence deny means objective existence deny and it is a contradictory. Whereas not only the objective existence is never a subjective concept of essence but also the essentiality is the same as objective existence and essential concept has the same meaning. Briefly, theorem of incumbency and possibility uses the need of possible being to be created objectively and since this objective needs has been realized, thus who obviates the need has objective fact (The same, 163-64, John Hack, 1993, 58-9).

Ebne Roshd, also has criticized Ebne Sina for “Being is incumbent or possible” and he said being means what exist and there is no equal ratio for existence and nullity for what now exist or possible to be existed, since he thought existence and essentiality are the same and being cannot be possible. However, it is possible to say division of being into incumbent and possible is not according to existence but based on logical analysis and nature aspect. Since possible has nature aspect (boundary and limit) whereas incumbent has not (Zehbi, 2004, 191) in other word, Ebne Roshd considered possibility as an adjective for being whereas Ebne Sina considered possibility as a nature attribute and he used this attribution for all things except for Holy God, it means essence possibility whereas Ebne Roshd considered just timely possibility (occurrence), (The same, 224-5).

In addition, there is an epistemological problem for this theorem, which says: this theorem is complete when objective external fact is wisdom and human subjective founds show external fact, but if external world has non-wisdom identity, then this theorem is not true.

For example this theorem based on fact division between essential and possible beings and this division is based on rejection of contradictory-union. So if outside object has no wisdom fact, then this theorem should be doubted.

To answer to this question it is easy to say:

This question based on skepticism and sure-denies beyond knowledge area and leads to sophistry. Whereas knowledge about fact is a clear subject and it is Hobson’s choice for human (Javadi Amoli, 1999, 164-65), (John Hack, 58-9).

Conclusion. According to the first readership, Ebne Sina starts from” there is being…” in which his reasons the same as for incumbency and possible based on “nature possibility.” This thesis is the major viewpoint by Ebne Sina’s interpreters and according to this theory; Mulla Sadra believes Ebne Sina’s theorem is not the same as Right proof, because Ebne Sina used the concept of existence, unlike him (Javadi Amoli, 1989, 133-36). Here is what Mulla Sadra says:

Because there is a real existence whereas he (Ebne sina) thought about the concept of existence (Mulla Sadra, 1990, 26-7/6).

Therefore, Mulla Sadra believes right proof is what starts from the fact of existence not “the concept of existence” and he says:

And the best and highest proof, which has no middle to prove, is the fact of existence, which is the way for purpose, and it is the purpose and the rights proof that saw the way to holy God.

According to second readership, Ebne Sina starts from “there is existence” his theorem of “incumbency and possibility” based on existence need of possible being which is according to relating existence. However if we accept this viewpoint as Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzevari has accepted in interpreting of the book “Asfar-volume6”, then there is no difference between Ebne Sina’s theorem or Mulla Sadra’s True theorem, except Mulla Sadra used his own philosophical principles such as: existence-pivot oriented, existence union, effect existence need to cause. Whereas Ebne Sina did not use this principle because it had not yet been discussed and presented (Zehbi, 2003, 194-5).

Therefore according to first readership” there is being……” then rejection of circuit and progression, either discussed such as Khaje Nasir and Mulla Sadra explained, or not as Ebne Sina explained in his book “Nejat” is the preliminary for mentioned theorem as a result to prove mentioned theorem, rejection of circuit and progression is used.

However according to second readership there is high similarities between Mulla Sadra’s right theorem and Ebne Sina’s theorem and rejection of progression and circuit is not preliminary for the theorem since there is no discuss about nature or concept of existence but the fact of existence and its union and essentiality is discussed.
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THE EFFECTS OF TAI CHI TRAINING PROGRAMS ON LOWER LIMB NERVE CONDUCTION VELOCITY IN PATIENTS WITH MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS

Zohre Mohali,
MD student in corrective exercise and Sport Injuries, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran
Ahmad Ebrahimini Atri,
Associate professor, Faculty of Sports and Physical Education, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran
Hossien Hassanabadi,
Assisstant professor in physical medicine and rehabilitation, Mashhad university of medical sciences, Iran
Maedeh Taghizadeh Kerman,
MD student, Faculty of Sports and Physical Education, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran
(*Corresponding Author)

Abstract. Objective: Imbalances and injuries due to falls avoid the use of body movement systems and gradually reduce the progression rate of peripheral nervous system. This study aims to investigate the effects of Tai Chi training programs on lower limb nerve conduction velocity in patients with MS. Materials and Methods: The subjects of present study consisted of 24 women with MS who were chosen through convenience sampling and then assigned randomly in two experimental and control groups. The training programs of experimental group included 8 weeks of Tai Chi training programs, 3 sessions in a week. Nervous electroneurographical parameters including nerve message conduction velocity and latency time were studied. The electroneurogram was used to record parameters. In order to analyze the data, dependent and independent sample of t-test were used and the level was considered significantly (p<0.05). Results: The results showed that nerve conduction velocity and time of latency before and after the interference in experimental group (p<0.05) were significantly different. There was also a significant difference in the mean velocity of nerve conduction and time of latency between experimental and control group (p< 0.05), so that the nerve conduction velocity in experimental group increased significantly after training programs and the time of latency decreased remarkably after interference. Conclusion: Tai Chi training programs can increase nerve conduction velocity.